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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM
I. ADmIwIsTRATIV LAW
Standardsto Guide Adxministrative Action
For the second time within two years the State's motion
picture censorship statute' was assailed as a prior restraint on
the exercise of freedom of expression, and as failing to provide
an adequate standard to satisfy the requirements of due process.2
A motion picture had been denied a license by the Board of
Regents' Motion Picture Division on the grounds that it was
"immoral" and that its exhibition "would tend to corrupt morals."
Construing "immoral" to refer to sexual immorality, the court
sustained (4-2) the statute as a reasonable exercise of the police
power.
Conceding that motion pictures now enjoy the same Constitutional protection accorded other media of expression,3 the court
pointed out that freedom, nevertheless, is not an "unrestricted
license" to act.4 The State may act to protect its citizens, even
to the extreme of interfering with personal liberty.5
The Miracle case6 was easily hurdled. In that case, though
denying to the State the right to prdtect any religion from hostile
views by a pre-censorship of those views under a statute condemning motion pictures if found to be "sacrilegious, " the Supreme
Court expressly left open the question whether motion pictures
may properly be the subject of special measures of control under
different criteria,8 for instance, under a statute designed to prevent the showing of obscene films.'
Equating "immoral" with "obscene," the Court of Appeals
seized upon this suggestion and decided the Miracle case was not
controlling. The court proceeded to justify the pre-censorship
feature of the statute as the only effective way to suppress those
films deemed undesirable.
-1. EDUCATION LAW § 122, providing a license shall issue "unless such film or a
part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character
that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime."
2. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N. Y. 336, 113 N. E. 2d

502 (1953).
3. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952) ; discussed in 2 BmLo. L. Rxv. 58. The
Burstyn case overruled Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230
(1915), on this
18oint.
4. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 89 (1890).
5. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1904); Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200
(1926).
6. See note 3 supra.

7. See note 1 supra.
8. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960 (1952), decided the week following on the
authority of the Burstyn case, supra note 3, did not resolve that issue. It struck down a
motion picture censorship statute on the score of indefiniteness.
9. Burstyn, v. Wilson, supra note 3 at 505-506.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The terms "moral" and "immoral" were held to refer to the
moral standards of the community, the "norm or standard of
behavior which struggles to make itself articulate in law."1 0 So
limited by common usage, they are not too broad. Persons of
ordinary intelligence know their meaning, kindred, as they are,
to "obscene" and "indecent.""
The suggestion that the court make an independent judgment
as to the picture in controversy was rejected. The Regents, an
experienced administrative body, were deemed better qualified to
judge the effect of a given motion picture. Judge Dye took issue
with the familiar doctrine limiting the function of the reviewing
court whenever there is a reasonable basis in law and support by
2 He claimed it was inconsistent with Constitutional
the record.'
guarantees to leave a debatable issue of morals to an administrative agency. The court, however, maintained that if the Regents
exercise their powers in a close case, and do so fairly and honestly,
then due process has been observed, 3 and if they err in law, the
court sits to correct them.
Delegation and the Court's Power to Review
Reliance on the good sense and judgment of the Board of
Regents was once again given by the court in Barsky v. Board of
Regents.' 4 There the medical licenses of two physicians were suspended for certain periods, and a third physician was reprimanded
and censured, all under the authority of the Election Law § 6514
(2) b, which authorizes disciplinary action against a physician
who "has been convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction,
either within or without this state, of a crime."
All three were members of the executive board of the Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee."5 They were convicted of the misdemeanor of contempt of Congress 6 in that each of them failed
to obey a subpoena directing him to produce before a Congressional Committee certain records of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
The judgments of conviction were affirmed on apCommittee.
7
peal
10. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCENCE 17, 4142 (1928).

11. People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 408 (1884).
12. Mounting & Finishing Co. v.McGoldrick, 294 N. Y. 104, 60 N. E. 2d 825
(1945).
13. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1912).
14. 305 N. Y. 89, 111 N. E. 2d 222 (1953).
15. See the statement of its history and aims in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Cominittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S.123, 130 (1950).
16. 2 U. S. C. A. § 192.
17. Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 (D. C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U. S. 843 (1948).

